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V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has discretionary appellate jurisdiction by writ of
certiorari on decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a)
& (5) (Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue is whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the term
"compensation" under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to not include payments
medical expenses subject to apportionment under that provision.
The standard of review for the court of appeals' interpretation/application of a
statute is correction-of-error. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, ^f 9,
84 P.3d 1201, 1205.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1. "As used in this chapter: . . . (3) 'Compensation' means the payments and
benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(3) (2005).
2. The "Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases" provision is set forth
verbatim in the Addendum to this brief. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the Case.
This is a petition, on writ of certiorari, to review the decision and opinion of the
Utah Court of Appeals in Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App
1

306 \ which affirmed the Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (hereinafter "Decision") of the
Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated November 30, 2006 (R.68-70), and
which likewise affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (hereinafter
"Order") of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") dated September 6, 2006
(R.53-57).
b.

Course of Proceedings.

On August 11, 2005, Jeffrey D. Smith (hereinafter "claimant") filed an
Application for Hearing alternatively claiming industrial accident or occupational disease
for a lower back condition he claims arose from working "as a meat packer for many
years [causing] cumulative injury to [his] lower back from excessive bending and lifting
of heavy meat." (R.l). Petitioners herein, Dale T. Smith & Sons, Inc. and Workers
Compensation Fund (hereinafter, collectively, "WCF") answered the Application by
generally denying that claimant's "low back condition was caused by any work-related
accident or exposures." (R. 16).
After discovery, the case proceeded to hearing on July 7, 2006.

The parties

stipulated that the matter should be heard on a theory of occupational disease, not
industrial accident. (R. 68 n.l). Also, claimant withdrew his claims for temporary total
1

This opinion was not published; however a companion case, Ameritech Library Services
v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, 169 P.3d 784, which adjudicated the same
issue, was published and relied upon by the court of appeals in this case. Likewise, this
court has granted certiorari in Ameritech.
2
Claimant also joined Liberty Insurance Corp., an earlier workers compensation
insurance carrier for Dale T. Smith & Sons, as a respondent. At the hearing, based upon
stipulation of the parties, Liberty Insurance Corp. was dismissed as a party. (R. 53, 56).

2

disability compensation and permanent partial impairment compensation because those
issues were resolved by stipulation of the parties prior to the hearing. (R. 54).
On September 6, 2006, the ALJ entered the Order, which determined, inter alia,
that because the claim was only for medical expenses and because even WCF's medical
evidence showed that at least thirty-five percent (35%) of claimant's condition was
attributable to occupational exposures,

WCF was liable for payment of all medical

expenses because such benefits are not "compensation" under the meaning of Section
34A-3-110 allowing for apportionment of

"compensation" against non-employment

causes of claimant's condition. In making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the
recent Labor Commission Appeals Board Order on Motion for Review in Edmonds v.
Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 29, 2006).4 (R. 55-56).
On .October 5, 2006, WCF filed a Motion for Review before the Labor
Commissioner, contending that although the ALJ properly applied the holding of
Edmonds, Edmonds was wrongly decided and should be overruled.5 (R. 59-61). On

WCF now admits that it is solely liable for claimant's occupational disease, subject to
apportionment for non-employment causes of claimant's low back condition.
Claimant never lost any work because of his condition so no temporary total disability
was owed. Based upon the independent medical examination report and addendum from
Dr. Stephen Marble, WCF admitted liability for permanent partial impairment
compensation for seven percent (7%) of the whole person.
The Edmonds case is the case now styled Ameritech Library Services v. Labor
Commission, 2007 UT App 305, 169 P.3d 784, now also before this court on certiorari.
WCF also argued that, because the apportionment was in dispute, that issue should have
been referred to a medical panel under both statutory and administrative provisions. Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (2005); Utah Admin. Code § R602-2-2(A)(l) (2007). Since the
Appeals Board rejected WCF's suggestion that the Labor Commission overrule
Edmonds, it did not reach this issue. If WCF prevails herein, then, on remand, the
3

November 30, 2006, the Labor Commission Appeals Board rejected WCPs contention
that Edmonds was wrongly decided and entered the Decision, consisting of two pages.
(R. 68-69).
c.

Disposition at Utah Court of Appeals.

As already stated, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision, holding that,
as it determined in Ameritech Library Services v. Labor Commission 2007 UT App 305,
169 P.3d 784, "compensation" does not include payment for medical expenses, thereby
subject to apportionment under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code. Dale T. Smith &
Sons v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 306, unnumbered f 2.
d.

Statement of Facts.

Claimant was employed at Petitioner Dale T. Smith and Sons at an early age in
1978. Dale T. Smith is claimant's grandfather, who founded the company as a family
business. Claimant worked initially cleaning corrals and the plant and then, at age 16
(1982), started working part time as a meat cutter. After college, claimant began working
full time as a meat cutter. This job required heavy lifting, bending, pushing and pulling
of cattle quarters and more. (R. 54).
In 1995, claimant began experiencing low back pain and sought treatment with a
chiropractor.

Claimant periodically obtained chiropractic treatments and other

conservative care for his low back pain over the years. Then, in 2003, claimant saw Dr.
Gordon Kimball, M.D., who ultimately referred claimant for an MRI, which disclosed an

Appeals Board will still need to consider whether the matter should be referred to a
medical panel.
4

L5-S1 disk extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes, all of which Dr. Kimball
attributed to claimant's work activities at Dale T. Smith & Sons. (R. 54, 74 [p. 12]).
During discovery, WCF obtained an independent medical examination from Dr.
Stephen Marble, M.D. In a report dated April 26, 2006, and an addendum thereto dated
May 30, 2006, Dr. Marble agreed that most of claimant's L5-S1 injury and some of
Smith's lumbar degenerative disease were attributable to claimant's work activities at
Dale T. Smith and sons. In general, Dr. Marble concluded that 35% of claimant's entire
low back condition was related to claimant's work activities and 65% to non-employment
causes and conditions. (R. 54-55, 74 [pp. 1-B to 1-C, 8-9]).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals did not properly interpret Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah
Code to conclude that payment of medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to
apportionment,, especially when considering the plain language of the definition of
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3). Moreover, in Ameritech, which it applied
here, the court of appeals improperly relied upon the rule of statutory construction
announced in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah
1979) and Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) because the
factual framework in neither Kennecott nor Christensen exists here.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY
CONCLUDED THAT PAYMENT OF MEDICAL
EXPENSES IS NOT "COMPENSATION" SUBJECT TO
APPORTIONMENT UNDER SECTION 34A-3-110 OF
THE UTAH CODE
In Ameritech, the court of appeals held that "because the [Workers Compensation
Act] excludes payment of medical expenses from the definition of compensation, the
term compensation as used in the [Utah Occupational Disease Act] also excludes medical
expenses." Ameritech Library Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, f 16,
169 P.3d 784, 789. The court of appeals mistakenly relied upon this court's decisions in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979) and
Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) in support of its holding
that "compensation", as interpreted in those cases under the Workers Compensation Act,
does not include payment of medical expenses. In Kennecott and Christensen this court
adopted a more narrow interpretation of "compensation" so that it would fulfill the intent
of the statutes of limitations considered in those cases; however, there was no such
justification here. Based upon rules of statutory construction and Taylor v. Industrial
Commission, 1A2> P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), the court of appeals should have adopted the
more general definition of "compensation" set forth in Section 34A-2-102(3).
Section 34A-3-110 provides that "[t]he compensation payable under this chapter
shall be reduced and limited" by causes outside employment in the State of Utah. Utah

6

Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, the key question is whether
payment of medical expenses is "compensation" within the meaning of Section 34A-3110.
In order to determine if the court of appeals correctly interpreted the term
"compensation" this court has held that it must first look to the plain language of the
statute. See, e.g., Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 46, 164 P.3d 384,
396; Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, K 9, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205
(workers compensation matters); see also, Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, %
18, 104 P.3d 1242 (general).
Although "compensation" is certainly defined in the dictionary, it is obviously a
term of art used throughout Title 34A, the Utah Labor Code. "Compensation" is not
defined in Section 34A-3-110, but has been defined in general definitions of the Utah
Labor Code as follows: "'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for
in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2102(3) (2005). Since payment of medical expenses is a "payment" and/or "benefit"
under the Occupational Disease Act {see Id., §§ 34A-2-418; 34A-3-102(2); 34A-3107(2)), it then should follow that under the plain language of Section 34A-2-102(3),
medical expenses are "compensation" subject to apportionment

under

Section 34A-

3-110.
Even assuming that it is not plain that the general definition of "compensation"
applies to Section 34A-3-110, this court has also held that "[sjtatutes should be read as a
whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions and statutes."

7

Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, If 46, 164 P.3d 384,396; Miller v.
tffeaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ 17, 66 P.3d 592.
Under another section of the Occupational Disease Act itself, the legislature
explicitly provides that in cases of occupational disease, an employer is liable to pay both
medical and disability (indemnity) benefits and then in following subsection of the very
same section, states that "compensation shall not be paid when the last day of injurious
exposure of the employee to the hazards of the occupational disease occurred prior to
1941." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-104 (2005) (emphasis added). Surely the legislature
intended this "statute of repose" also to include both types of benefits together as
"compensation?"
Likewise, under Section 34A-3-111 of the Occupational Disease Act, the
legislature explicitly provides that "compensation under this chapter is not in addition to
compensation that may be payable under [the Workers Compensation Act] . . . ." Id., §
34A-3-111 (emphasis added).

Surely, the legislature did not intend that an injured

worker could not recover indemnity benefits for the same injury (medical condition)
under both the Workers Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act, yet could
recover medical expenses under both acts?
The court of appeals takes a more narrow approach by contending that Section
34A-3-110, by its terms, is limited to cases of occupational disease resulting in disability
or death only.

Therefore, the court of appeals reasons, the legislature did not intend

"compensation" in that section to include payment of medical expenses.

8

Ameritech

Library Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 306, U 14, 169 P.3d at 788.6 But,
under the Occupational Disease Act, a cause of action for occupational disease arguably
does not even arise until the employee has suffered disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3108(2)(b) (2005). Moreover, Section 34A-3-107 provides that u[t]he disabled employee
is entitled to medical, hospital and burial expenses . . . ," Id., § 34A-3-107(2) (emphasis
added), which implies that the employee must be disabled before he is entitled to any
benefits under

the Occupational Disease Act. Of course, if, within the meaning of

Sections 34A-3-107 and -108, disability has a more general meaning of loss of bodily
function, as opposed to disability from employment, then that meaning makes more sense
in the context of the Occupational Disease Act as a whole, including Section 34A-3-110.
Otherwise, an employee could suffer an occupational disease for which he seeks payment
of medical expenses only, but not have a cause of action to recover such benefits because
he has not yet lost work as a result. It is doubtful that this is what the legislature
intended.
As stated above, the court of appeals supports its deviation from the plain language
of Section 34A-2-102(3) by relying upon Kennecott and Christensen to show that this

6

The court of appeals partly bases this contention on the fact that Section 34A-3-105 of
the Occupational Disease Act does specifically include medical expenses in the
apportionment formula when the apportionment of harmful exposures at other employers
is at issue. Id. Interestingly, claimant has previously argued that one reason medical
expenses should not be apportioned in the current context is that it would be difficult to
administer when the claim is for medical expenses only. Yet, it would be just as difficult,
if not more so in the case of multiple employers, when Section 34A-3-105 likewise
applies to a claim for medical expenses only.
9

court has already interpreted "compensation" to not include payment of medical
expenses.
In both Kennecott and Christensen, this court interpreted "compensation" within
the more narrow meaning of that term in the then statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-99 (1953 codification). This court did not consider the more general meaning of
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3).7 Had this court adopted the more general
definition of "compensation" under the then version of Section 34A-2-102(3), it would
have rendered the statute of limitations regarding indemnity benefits meaningless. In that
regard, this court stated as follows:
[I]f the furnishing of or payment for medical expenses by the company,
which may continue indefinitely, were to extend the limitation in which a
claim may be filed until three years after the last payment of such
medical expense, that would completely nullify any effect to be given to
Sec. 35-1-99, and thus defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of
that statute. That would be contrary to a cardinal rule of statutory
construction: that, if there is uncertainty of doubt as to the meaning of
statutes, they should be so interpreted and implied as to give meaning in
effect to both.
Kennecott Copper Corp., v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979)
(citing, 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 253).
In Christensen, this court held the same on converse facts: that "compensation"
cannot be interpreted to limit the statute of limitations for payment of medical expenses

7

Although Section 34A-2-102(3) was numbered differently as Section § 35-1-44(6) in
the Workers Compensation Act and Section 35-2-12(b) in the Occupational Disease Act
when Kennecott and Christensen were decided in 1979 and 1982, the basic definition has
not changed.

10

to the same period as for indemnity benefits. Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642
P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982).
In the instant case, since no conflict is created by applying the more general
definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3), the court of appeals and Labor
Commission need not have reverted to the rule of statutory construction stated in
Kennecott to resolve a conflict between statutes.
The narrow applicability of Kennecott and Christensen is further illustrated in
another Utah Supreme Court case that determined that "compensation" does include
medical expenses. In Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 1A2> P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), a
claimant sought a determination that payment of medical expenses were not
"compensation" to which a claim for reimbursement and offset against recovery in a
s
Third Party action would be applied under the then version of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2106 (2005).8 This court upheld the ALJ and Labor Commission's holding that within the
meaning of the then version of Section 34A-2-106, "compensation" did include payment
of medical expenses. Id., at 1185-86 (citing 2A A. Larsen, Workers' Compensation Law
§ 74.33). Although Taylor did not directly consider the interpretation of "compensation"
found in Kennecott, it is obvious that the supreme court can and does apply differing
interpretations depending upon the context of the statute. Here, as already stated, the
context of the statute requires the more general definition of compensation under Section
34A-2-102(3).

The then version was Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1987).
ll

It is also interesting to note that Taylor was decided after both Kennecott and
Christensen.

The court of appeals reasoned that since the legislature had left the

definition of "compensation", now under Section 34A-2-102(3), unchanged since
Kennecott and Christensen were decided, "'the legislature is presumed to have been
satisfied with the prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and
to have adopted them as consistent with its own intent."' Ameritech Library Services v.
Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, \ 12, 169 P.3d 784, 787 (quoting Christensen,
642 P.2d at 756). Of course, WCF urges that this court does adopt this reasoning of the
court of appeals; that is, if the legislature had not changed the general definition of
"compensation" since Taylor was decided, then it must have intended the interpretation
there to apply to future cases, including the instant case.9
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the decision of the court
of appeals and remand the case for further .proceedings before the Appeals Board and,
ultimately, the ALJ.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this ^27^

day of February, 2008.

Floyd W Holm, Attorney for Petitioners
9

In fairness to the court of appeals, it should be noted that Taylor was not mentioned in
the briefing in Ameritech; however, it was thoroughly discussed in the briefing before the
court of appeals in this case. Also, this argument is somewhat "tongue in cheek". WCF
still maintains its fundamental argument that "compensation" can mean different things
in different contexts.
12
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Text of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005)

A

§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases

The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease,
or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.

l

Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Labor Commission,
2007 UT App 306

B

Dale T. Smith & Sons and Workers' Compensation Fund, Petitioners, v. Labor
Commission and Jeffrey D. Smith, Respondents.
Case No. 20061169-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2007 UTApp 306; 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 314

September 20, 2007, Filed
NOTICE:

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Original Proceeding in this Court.
Ameritech Library Servs. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UTApp 305, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 320 (2007)
DISPOSITION:

Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.
Phillip B. Shell, Murray, and Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
JUDGES: Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge, William A. Thome Jr.,
Judge.
OPINION BY: Carolyn B. McHugh
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
McHUGH, Judge:
Dale T. Smith & Sons and the Workers' Compensation Fund (collectively Petitioners) seek review of the Utah
Labor Commission's order requiring that they pay 100% of Jeffrey D. Smith's medical expenses related to treatment
of his lumbar degenerative joint disease. Petitioners argue that the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted Utah
Code section 34A-3-110 when it determined that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to apportionment
under that section. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-IJ0 (2005).
In Ameritech Library Sei'vices v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 305, a companion case that was briefed
concurrently with this case, we rejected arguments identical to those raised by Petitioners. In Ameritech we held that
the term "compensation," as used in section 34A-3-110, does not include medical expenses and that apportionment
of medical expenses is not appropriate [*2] under that section of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. See id. at
PP14-16. For the reasons stated in that decision, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1

Ameritech Library Services v. Labor Commission,
2007 UT App 305,169 P.3d 784

c

Ameritech Library Services (DYNIX) and/or American Manufacturing
Mutual/Kemper, Petitioners, v. Labor Commission and Tamara Edmonds,
Respondents.
Case No. 20060870-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2007 UTApp 305; 169 R3d 784; 587 Utah Adv, Rep, 5; 2007 Utah App, LEXIS 320

September 20, 2007, Filed
performing [***2] other miscellaneous tasks necessary
to complete projects. ' In 1992, Edmonds first noticed
intermittent pain in her wrists. The pain became constant
in the fall of 1993, and Edmonds sought medical
treatment in January 1994. Treatment for her pain
continued over the course of the next several years. She
terminated her employment in 1999. By that time, her
symptoms included bilateral pain and numbness in the
fingers, hands, wrists, arms, shoulders, neck, and head.
Despite Edmonds ending her employment with
Ameritech, the pain continued.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Companion case at Dale T.
Smith & Sons v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UTApp 306, 2007
Utah App. LEXIS 314 (2007)
DISPOSITION: [***!]

Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Joseph C. Alamilla and Theodore E.
Kanell, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.
Phillip B. Shell, Murray, and Alan L. Hennebold, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents.

1 Eventually, Edmonds accepted a position as
an inside sales representative. However, most of
her duties remained the same, requiring constant
desk and telephone work.

JUDGES: Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge. WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge, William A. Thome
Jr., Judge.

[*P3]
In September 2002, Edmonds filed an
Application for Hearing with the Commission seeking
further coverage for carpal tunnel syndrome, which she
attributed to the repetitive trauma to her hands and arms
from excessive keyboard use and other job activities with
Ameritech. The Commission appointed a medical panel
to evaluate the conflicting medical aspects of Edmonds's
claim. The panel opined that Edmonds's work activities
acted as a 10% aggravation of the 90% non-industrial
risk factors that
[***3] caused her carpal tunnel
syndrome. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
concluded that "10% of the cause of [Edmonds's] carpal
tunnel symptoms is related to her work exposure
throughout her period of employment with [Ameritech]."

OPINION BY: Carolyn B. McHugh
OPINION
Original Proceeding in this Court
[**784] McHUGH, Judge:
[*P1] Ameritech Library Services and American
Manufacturing Mutual/Kemper (collectively Ameritech)
petition for review of the Utah Labor Commission's (the
Commission) order requiring that they pay 100% of
Tamara Edmonds's medical expenses related to treatment
of her carpal tunnel syndrome. Ameritech argues that the
Appeals Board of the Commission (the Appeals Board)
erred when it failed to properly apply Utah Code section
34A-3-110, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-JI0 (2005), to
apportion medical expenses based on the causal
contribution of industrial factors to Edmonds's
occupational disease. We affirm.

[*P4] Edmonds filed a motion for review with the
Appeals Board arguing that the ALJ erred in
apportioning medical expenses pursuant to section 34A3-110, see id., which resulted in the determination that
Ameritech was liable for only 10% of Edmonds's
medical expenses. The Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's
finding that Edmonds's carpal tunnel syndrome had a
10% causal connection to industrial factors, but reversed
the ALJ's determination that Ameritech was liable for
only 10% of Edmonds's medical expenses. Instead, the
Appeals Board concluded that apportionment under

[**785] BACKGROUND
[*P2]
Ameritech Library Services employed
Edmonds as a project coordinator and administrative
assistant from 1991 until 1999. Edmonds's duties
included scheduling and completing purchase orders for
all equipment, entering data, installing hardware, and
1

section 34A-3-110, see id., was not applicable to medical
expenses and that Ameritech, therefore, was liable for
100% of those expenses. Ameritech seeks review of the
Appeals Board's decision.

Id. §34A-3-l 10 (2005).
[*P7] Thus, the narrow question presented by this
case is whether the term compensation under section
34A-3-110 of the UODA, see id., includes payments for
medical expenses. If it does, then Edmonds's claim for
future medical expenses should be apportioned, requiring
Ameritech to pay only that share of the medical expenses
attributable to the industrial cause of Edmonds's diseasehere, 10%. If compensation does not include payments
for medical expenses, then apportionment under section
34A-3-110 is inapplicable and Edmonds is entitled to
recover all medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
her disease regardless of the percentage attributable to an
industrial cause.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P5] Ameritech argues that the Appeals Board
incorrectly interpreted "compensation" as used in Utah
Code section 34A-3-110, see id., when it concluded that
medical expenses were not included [***4] in the term
and were therefore not apportionable under the statute.
M
[A]n agency's interpretation or application of statutory
terms should be reviewed under the correction-of-error
standard." Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT66,P14,
7 P.3d 777\ see also Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT
App 179,P13, 136 P.3d 1273 ("We review the [Labor]
Commission's interpretations of law under a correctionof-error standard."). "Additionally, if the legislative
intent concerning the specific question at issue can be
derived through traditional methods of statutory
construction, the agency's interpretation will be granted
no deference and the statute will be interpreted in accord
with its legislative intent." Esquivel, 2000 UT 66 at PI4,
7 P.3d 777 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[*P8] In support [***6] of its contention that the
term compensation, as used in section 34A-3-110,
includes payments for medical expenses, Ameritech
relies on section 34A-2-102(3) of the Workers'
Compensation Act (WCA), see id. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905
(2005 & Supp. 2007), which defines "[compensation" to
"mean[] the payments and benefits provided for in this
chapter[, WCA,] or Chapter 3, [UODA]," id § 34A-2102(3) (2005). Ameritech reasons that medical expenses
are both a payment and a benefit for Edmonds's
industrial disease.

ANALYSIS
[*P6] Ameritech argues that the Appeals Board
erred when it determined that apportionment of
Edmonds's medical expenses was not appropriate under
section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act
(UODA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-3-101 to -J 12
(2005 & Supp. 2007). Section 34A-3-110 states in
relevant part:

[*P9] Between 1979 and 1982, however, the Utah
Supreme Court twice addressed whether the term
compensation as used in the WCA included payments for
medical expenses. In the first case, Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah
1979), the court held that, under the WCA, the term
compensation did not include payments for medical or
hospital expenses. See id. at 877 ("[T]here is a distinct
difference between 'compensation' which is paid for an
injury in lieu of wages which otherwise would have been
earned, and the adjunctive award of medical and hospital
expenses for treating the injury."). The supreme court
reached this conclusion without specifically referencing
the [***7] definition of compensation in the WCA, but
instead relied upon two provisions of the WCA, Utah
Code sections 35-1-45 2 and 35-1-81. 3 See id. The
Kennecott court determined that these two sections
"treat[ed] medicals as something different from the
compensation in lieu of wages, and that it therefore"
followed that medical expenses are not compensation
within the meaning of the WCA. Id.

The compensation payable under this
chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that
would
[***5] be payable if the
occupational disease were the sole cause
of disability or death, as the occupational
disease as a causative factor bears to all
the causes of the disability or [**786]
death when the occupational disease, or
any part of the disease:

(3) is aggravated by any other disease
or infirmity not itself compensable; or

2 Section 35-1-45 stated in relevant part:

(4) when disability or death from any
other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in
any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.

Every employee . . . who is
injured . . . by accident arising out
of or in the course of his
employment . . . shall be paid,
such compensation for loss
2

sustained on account of such
injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse and hospital
services and medicines, and, in
case of death, such amount of
funeral expenses, as is herein
provided.

Act of Mar. 4, 1997, ch. 375, sec. 84, § 34A-2102, 1997 Utah Laws 1438, 1474 (renumbering
section 35A-3-J02 as 34A-2-102 and amending to
add reference to the Utah Occupational Disease
Act in definition of compensation).
[*P11]
The Christensen court disagreed.
Reaffirming Kennecott, the supreme court held that
despite the broad definition of compensation in the
WCA, the term did not include medical expenses. See id.
at 757. The court reasoned that because it had previously
determined that medical expenses were outside the
definition of compensation, and because the Utah
Legislature had not amended or changed the two sections
of the Utah Code relied upon for that decision-sections
35-1-45 and 35-1-81--that the legislature must have
ratified, as consistent with its own intent, the definition
of compensation announced in Kennecott. See id. at 75657.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1974) (current
version at id. § 34A-2-401 (2005)).
3 Section 35-1-81 provided in relevant part:
In addition to the compensation
provided for in this title the
employer or the insurance carrier
shall also be required to pay such
reasonable sum for medical, nurse
and hospital services, and for
medicines . . . as may be necessary
to treat the patient....

[*P12] Since the Utah Supreme Court decided
Kennecott and Christensen, the Utah Legislature has left
the statutes relied upon for those decisions largely
unchanged. Although section 35-1-45 has been
renumbered twice and subdivided [***10] once since
Kennecott, 5 it remains substantively similar to the
previous version. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401
(2005), 6 with id. § 35-1-45 (1974) (amended and
renumbered). Furthermore, the legislature has left intact
over the last twenty-five years the language of section
35-1-81 relied upon by the Kennecott court. See id. § 351-81 (Supp. 1979) (amended and renumbered);
Kennecott, 597 P.2d at 877. Indeed, it has done so while
amending other portions of section 35-1-81 to
specifically refer to the UODA. See Act of Mar. 4, 1997,
ch. 375, sec. 126, § 34A-2-418, 1997 Utah Laws 1438,
1498 (renumbering section 35A-3-418 as 34A-2-418 and
amending to add a reference to UODA). In its current
form the section states:

Id. § 35-1-81 (Supp. 1979) (current version
[***8] at id § 34A-2-418 (2005)).
[*P10] In 1982, the supreme court again considered
the question of whether compensation, as defined by the
WCA, included medical expenses. In Christensen v.
Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982), the
petitioners made an argument identical to that asserted
here by Ameritech. Relying on a prior version of section
34A-2-102(3), which defined compensation to "mean the
payments and benefits provided for in this title," Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-44(6) (1974) (current version at id. §
34A-2-102(3) (2005)), 4 the petitioners argued that
medical [**787] expenses were both a payment and a
benefit under the WCA. See Christensen, 642 P.2d at
756.

(1) In addition to the compensation
provided in this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act, the
employer or the insurance carrier shall
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse,
and hospital services, for medicines, and
for artificial means, appliances, and
prostheses necessary to treat the injured
employee.

4 At the time the Utah Supreme Court decided
Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d
755 (Utah 1982), the definition of compensation
for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act
was found in section 35-1-44(6). See Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-44(6) (1974) (amended and
renumbered at id. § 34A-2-102(3) (2005)). Since
that time, the legislature has amended and
renumbered the section several times. See, e.g.,
Act of Feb. 7, 1991, ch. 136, sec. 3, § 35-1-44,
1991 Utah Laws 496, 497 (amending some
defined terms, adding new terms, and
renumbering); [***9] Act of Feb. 27, 1996, ch.
240, sec. 106, § 35A-3-102, 1996 Utah Laws 893,
938 (renumbering section 35-1-44 as 35A-3-102);

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 (2005) (emphasis added).
This amendment is particularly instructive because, as
the Kennecott court noted, the use of the phrase [***! 1]
"y[i]n addition to the compensation provided for'"
indicates that the legislature intended to "treat[] medicals

3

as something different from the compensation in lieu of
wages." 597 P.2d at 877 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 351-81 (Supp. 1979) (amended and renumbered)).
Moreover, because the legislature chose to insert a
reference to the UODA in section 34A-2-418 without
otherwise changing the substantive language, we must
assume that, like the WCA, medical expenses are
something in addition to or otherwise separate from
compensation for purposes of the UODA. See
Christensen, 642 P.2d at 756 ("A well-established canon
of statutory construction provides that where a legislature
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions
unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the
legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior
judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the
statute and to have adopted them as consistent with
[**788] its own intent."); see also Brown & Root Indus.
Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 674 (Utah
1997) (noting that compensation has been construed "to
exclude medical expenses" within the meaning of WCA
(citing Kennecott, 597 P.2d 875)); United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764, 766
(Utah 1983) [***12] (noting that Kennecott "draws a
distinction between compensation which is paid for an
injury and medical and hospital expenses which are paid
for treatment of the injury"); Christensen, 642 P.2d at
756-57; Kennecott, 597P.2d at 877-78.

(i)
medical,
nurse, and hospital
services;
(ii) medicines;
and
(iii) in case of
death, the amount
of funeral expenses.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2005).
[*P13] Ameritech argues that the Kennecott and
Christensen decisions are limited to their facts and only
govern the resolution of issues related [***13] to the
applicable statute of limitations. In support of its
position, Ameritech notes the express provision allowing
for the apportionment of medical expenses in the case of
occupational disease. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3105(2) ("[Liability for disability, death, and medical
benefits shall be apportioned between employers based
on the involved employers' causal contribution to the
occupational disease."). According to Ameritech, the fact
that apportionment was expressly added to section 34A3-105 after the decisions in Kennecott and Christensen
indicates the legislature's intent to supersede the analysis
in those cases. In addition, Ameritech argues that it
would make no sense for the legislature to allow
apportionment of medical expenses in the context of an
occupational disease under section 34A-3-105, see id. §
34A-3-105, but not under section 34A-3-U0, see id. §
34A-3-110. Consequently, Ameritech contends that the
use of the term compensation in section 34A-3-110, see
id., must have included medical expenses as well as
payments made in lieu of wages. We are not persuaded
by this argument.

5 See Act of Feb. 27, 1996, ch. 240, sec. 144, §
35A-3-401, 1996 Utah Laws 893, 952
(renumbering section 35-1-45 as 35A-3-401); Act
of Mar. 4, 1997, ch. 375, sec. 109, § 34A-2-401,
1997 Utah Laws 1438, 1488 (renumbering
section 35A-3-40I as 34A-2-401); Workers
Compensation Coverage Amendments, ch. 55,
sec. 6, § 34A-2-40J, 1999 Utah Laws 215, 222
(dividing section 34A-2-40I into subsections).
6 The current version provides:

[*P14] First, section 34A-3-110 is limited to
situations in which the occupational disease causes
[***14] "disability or death." Id. ("The compensation
payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited
to the proportion of the compensation that would be
payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of
disability or death . . . ."). Here, Edmonds has not died
and the Commission expressly found that "Ms. Edmonds
has not shown that her carpal tunnel syndrome caused
any disability, but she has required medical care."
Second, the inclusion of apportionment language in
section
34A-3-105
evidences
the
legislature's
understanding of how to make allocation available.
Consequently, the omission of such language in section
34A-3-110 indicates that the legislature did not intend to
allow apportionment under that section. See, e.g., State

(1) An employee . . . who is
injured . . . by accident arising out
of and in the course of the
employee's employment, . . . shall
be paid:
(a) compensation
for loss sustained
on account of the
injury or death;
(b) the amount
provided in this
chapter for:

4

to Edmonds's medical expenses for carpal tunnel
syndrome.

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187
(Utah 1996) (concluding that where provisions in one
section show that the legislature knew how to make its
intent clear, absence of similar language in a different
section indicates contrary intent); State v. Hobbs, 2003
UT App 27,P2l, 64 P.3d 1218 (same); In re A.B., 936
P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). Third, to
the extent that the legislature is unclear, we must
interpret the UODA [***15] liberally in favor of the
claimant to implement its remedial purpose. See, e.g.,
State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 105J,
1053 (Utah 1984) ("The [WCA] should be liberally
construed and applied to provide coverage."); Luckau v.
Industrial Comm'n, 840 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) ("[A]ny doubts [about the interpretation of the
UODA] should be resolved in favor of the applicant.").
Resolving any doubts in favor of Edmonds, we conclude
that the Appeals Board was correct in disallowing
apportionment of medical expenses under section 34A-3110.

[*P17] Affirmed.
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
[*P18] WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
William

[*P15] Ameritech's final argument is that, from a
public policy standpoint, it makes no sense to require an
employer to pay 100% of the medical expenses for the
treatment of a disease that has only a 10% contribution
from industrial causes. While this argument may be
appropriately made to the legislature, we simply cannot
substitute our judgment for its in matters of public
policy. Cf. Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT
57,P30, 96 P.3d 903 (noting that allocation of recovery
under the WCA "is a matter for legislative, rather than
judicial, determination"). Had the legislature intended to
require apportionment of medical expenses [***16]
based on the employer's causal contribution [**789] to
the occupational disease it would have done so. Cf., e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105 (requiring that medical
expenses be apportioned between two or more employers
relative to their causal contribution to the occupational
disease under the WCA). 7
7
Counsel for Edmonds noted, during oral
argument, that there may be persuasive policy
reasons for eliminating any dispute about medical
expenses so that applicants can be treated
immediately, without any confusion as to whether
medical providers will be compensated.
CONCLUSION
[*P16] The UODA uses the same definition of
compensation as the WCA. Consequently, because the
WCA excludes medical expenses from the definition of
compensation, the term compensation as used in the
UODA also excludes medical expenses. Therefore, the
Appeals Board of the Commission properly concluded
that apportionment under Utah Code section 34A-3-110
of the Utah Occupational Disease Act was not applicable
5
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Order Affirming ALJ's Decision,
(Appeals Board, November 30, 2006)

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

**C£JVEo

JEFFREY D. SMITH,
Worker ~
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER AFFIRMING
ALPS DECISION

DALE T. SMITH & SONS and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 05-0707

Respondents.

Dale T. Smith & Sons and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to
jointly as "Smith & Sons" hereafter), request review of Administrative Law Judge Hann's decision
awarding medical benefits to Jeffrey D. Smith under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act";
Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-12, §34A-2-801(3) and §34A-3-102.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Jeffrey Smith seeks payment of medical expenses necessary to treat his degenerative low
back condition.1
Smith & Sons contends that Mr. Smith's low back condition should be
apportioned between work and non-work causes and that Smith & Son's liabihty for medical
expenses should be limited accordingly.
In her decision of September 6, 2006, Judge Harm denied Smith & Sons' request for
apportionment of Mr. Smith's medical expenses. In doing so, she relied on the Appeals Board's
decision in Tamara Edmonds v. Epixtech, et al. (Labor Commission Case No. 02-0969; issued
August 29, 2006), which held that medical expenses are nor subject to the apportionment provisions
of §34A-3-l 10 of the Act. In seeking review of Judge Hann's decision, Smith & Sons argues that
Edmonds was wrongly decided

l Irfrfiiny7"Mr~SmiTir"original 1 y~file d~alfernafive claims "tor medicafTJenefitsf"arid""disabilTty"
compensation under both the Utah Occupational Disease Act and the Utah Workers 1 Compensation
Act Mr Smith also named Liberty Insurance Corp as a respondent. Liberty was later dismissed
from these proceedings and the remaining parties resolved Mr. Smith's claim for disability
compensation Consequently, the only remaining issue is Mr Smith's right to payment of medical
expenses With the apparent consent of the parties, fudge Hann adjudicated that issue under the
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act.
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DISCUSSION
In Edmonds the Appeals Board concluded that §34 A-3-110's use of the term "compensation"
for purposes of apportionment must be understood in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), which held that
compensation did not include medical benefits. The Appeals Board further concluded that this
interpretation was supported by the principle that the Act must be liberally construed and the
impossibility of ap)plying §34A-3-l 10's apportionment provision to medical-only claims.
Having visited this issue once again, the Appeals Board believes the reasoning followed in
Edmonds is correct. Under that reasoning, Mr. Smith's medical expenses are not subject to
apportionment under §34A-3-l 10.
ORDER
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Hann's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 30

day of November, 2006.

Colleen S. Colton, Chair
T ^ C T ^ ^
Patricia S. Drawe

Josej^E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the I Itah Court of Appeals
•by^liftjE^^etrtiorrfor^
petition foi icviewnmrastijCTeceivgd~bTth(r"
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Jeffrey
D. Smith, Case No. 05-0707, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 3C) day of November,
2006, to the following:
Jeffrey D. Smith
655E12500S
Draper UT 84020
Dale T. Smith & Sons
12450 Pony Express
Draper UT 84020
Liberty Insurance Corp
175 Berkeley St
Boston MA 02117
Floyd Holm, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
392 E 6400 S
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Phillip Shell, Esq.
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Bret Gardner, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order,
Dated September 6, 2006

1^

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800
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JEFFREY D SMITH,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.
DALE T SiMITH AND SONS and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP,
Respondent

Case No. 05-0707
Judge Debbie L. Hann

HEARING:

Room 332 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on July 7, 2006 at 8:30 AM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Jeffrey D Smith, was present and represented by his/her
attorney Phillip Shell Esq.
The respondents, Dale T Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq. The respondents,
Dale T Smith and Sons and Liberty Insurance Corp were represented by
attorney Bret Gardner Esq.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner's Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation and permanent partial compensation as the result of
a cumulative trauma injury and an occupational disease to the petitioner's low back. The
Commission issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings & Order for Answer on August
17, 2005. Both Answers denied the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury or occupational
disease.
Prior to the hearing, Liberty Insurance Corp, filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party to the
proceedings. This motion was granted at the hearing based upon the stipulation of the parties.
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At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew its claims for compensation as those issues had been
resolved leaving the medical claim as outstanding. The only issue remaining as to medical
expenses is the apportionment between industrial and non-industrial causes.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner is employed by the respondent a family business. He began at age 12 after school
cleaning corrals and the plant. He began working part time as a meat cutter at age 16 and then
began working full time as a meat cutler when he joined the business full time following college.
Generally, this employment required the petitioner to regularly lift and manipulate quarters of
beef weighing 100-200 pounds, haul live cattle, including "downer" cows that required the
petitioner to prod, shock, push, pull, lift and twist to get these immobile cows into trailers The
petitioner is now age 40 and suffers from lumbar degenerative joint disease.
The petitioner sought treatment for low back pain in August 1995 and was diagnosed with
"sciatic neuralgia'* by Dr. Egbert, a chiropractor. The petitioner sought treatment for low back
pain off and on with chiropractors over the years.
On September 22, 2003, the petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Kimball for, among other
things, low back pain. He was assessed with a lumbar sprain and an MRI was recommended.
Medical exhibit 15. The MRI was done on September 26, 2003 and revealed the L5-S1 disc
extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes but the petitioner did not get the results of this report
until February 2004. Medical exhibit 77-78, 14.
The petitioner told his father and uncles, the owners of Dale T. Smith and Sons, about his back
condition as the result of the heaving lifting at work. The petitioner reported back pain as the
result of heavy lifting to his family members over the years of working. The petitioner
characterized Dr. Kimball's report to him as having the back of "a 65 year old man" and when he
realized he had more than a temporary back strain, he reported his condition to his father and
uncles. The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, filed a first report of injury in September 2004
after the petitioner expressed concern that his claim might not be covered for lack of notice.
The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, received timely notice of the petitioner's claim.
Whether a first report was timely prepared by the employer is not within the control of the
employee who reported his industrial back condition, progressing from temporary strains to the
current claim of lumbar degenerative disc disease.
Dr. Kimball attributed the petitioner's L5-S1 ruptured disc and narrowing at L4-5 and L2-3 to
"years of rigorous work ex: lifting, turning, pulling." MedicaJ exhibit 13.
Dr. Marble opined that 75% of the petitioner's L5-S1 condition was caused by his work activities
and that 25% of the other lumbar degenerative changes were caused by work activities.
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Medical exhibit 9. In a subsequent addendum to his original report, Dr. Marble apportioned 3 5 %
of the petitioner's "entire overall low back condition'* to his work activities and 75% to nonindustrial conditions. Dr. Marble assigned a 7% whole person impairment for the petitioner's
L5-S1 disk condition fully to the petitioner's work activities. Medical exibit 1-B.
The petitioner's employment activities with the respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, caused in
full or in part, the petitioner's degenerative lumbar disc disease.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and in the
course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment." Utah Code
Ann. §34A-3-i03.
Utah Code § 34A-3-108(2) outlines the petitioner's reporting obligation for an occupational
disease:
(2) (a) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division
within 180 days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of benefits
arising from the occupational disease.
(b) The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first suffered
disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by employment.
Utah Code § 34A-3-110 outlines when "compensation" should be 3pportioned to account for
other non-compensable contributing causes. In Edmonds v. Epixtech et al.» Case No. 02-0969
(issued 8/29/06)1, the Commission Appeals Board ruled that medical benefits are not
compensation under § 34A-3-110 and therefore not subject to apportionment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner suffered a compensable occupational disease, degenerative lumbar disc disease,
while employed by the respondent, Dale T. Smiths and Sons.
The respondent, Liberty Insurance Co., is dismissed as a party to this claim.

This ease aopears lo overrule the holding in MilliRan v Utah Stale Tax Commission, Case, No. 00-0232 (issued
4/30/02).
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The respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation Fund, are liable to the
petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the petitioner's low back condition
pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers
Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the
petitioner's low back condition pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, Liberty Insurance Co, is dismissed as a party
to this claim.
DATED September 6, 2006.

/I

Debbie L. Harm
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on September 6, 2006, to the
persons/parties at the following addresses:
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Phillip Shell Esq
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Bret Gardner Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Floyd Holm Esq
392 E 6400 S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

ULAHiABOR COMMISSION
Clerk, Adjudication Division
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

